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Elonis v. United States: The Doctrine of True Threats: 
Protecting Our Ever-Shrinking First Amendment Rights in 
the New Era of Communication 
Mary Margaret Roark* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech.”1 Such protection has withstood the test of time 
and is heralded as one of our most precious rights as Americans. “The hallmark of 
the protection of free speech is to allow ‘free trade in ideas’—even ideas that the 
overwhelming majority of people might find distasteful or discomforting.”2 
However, “[t]here are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, 
the prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any 
Constitutional problem.”3 
One such form of speech is the “true threat.”4 In proscribing such speech, it 
becomes paramount to tread with care so as to not infringe upon the protections 
afforded by the First Amendment. Requiring only that a listener be reasonable in 
interpreting speech as a threat results in an improper intrusion upon that right. 
Requiring the speaker’s subjective intent, rather, will protect the sanctity of the 
First Amendment. Though many courts have adopted the objective test, the U.S. 
Supreme Court now has the opportunity, in deciding Elonis v. United States, to 
take a monumental step in protecting the First Amendment right to free speech. 
Holding that the speaker’s subjective intent to threaten is necessary for a true threat 
                                                          
* J.D. candidate, University of Mississippi School of Law, Class of 2016. The author would like 
to thank her family and friends for their unending support and Professor George Cochran for imparting 
his wisdom. 
1 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
2 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) (quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 
630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)); see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a 
bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the 
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”). 
3 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942). 
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conviction will restore the broad protection afforded by the First Amendment and 
repair the erosion caused by decisions adopting an objective approach. 
A. Hypothetical Threat Prosecution 
Picture the following scenario. Your wife cheated on you, and tensions have 
been running high since you split. She called law enforcement several times and 
obtained a restraining order against you. You are angry. You have always been able 
to express your emotions through writing song lyrics. In fact, you have a Facebook 
page on which you often post them. In your frustrated mindset, you feel that you 
could channel this emotion into some lyrics. After you complete your post, you 
click “enter” and publish the words to your Facebook timeline. 
Weeks later, you receive notice that you are being sued under 33 U.S.C. 
§ 875(c) for transmitting through interstate commerce communication containing a 
threat to injure another person.5 Apparently your Facebook page viewers do not 
share your passion for communicating anger through online posting of song lyrics, 
even if you meant it as an artistic expression. During your trial, you want to explain 
yourself, but the judge has instructed that no consideration will be given to your 
state of mind while making the post. The only question is whether a reasonable 
person could interpret the communication as a threat. Suddenly, your decision to 
press enter and post those words–—a decision that seemed virtually harmless at 
first–—now has far greater consequences than you ever imagined. This 
hypothetical is strikingly similar to the situation before the Supreme Court in 
Elonis v. United States.6 The issue at hand requires the Supreme Court to again turn 
its attention to the issue of true threats and the requisite intent needed to prosecute a 
person for transmitting such threats. 
B. The True Threat Doctrine 
In Elonis v. United States, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to address 
whether the “conviction of threatening another person under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) 
requires proof of the defendant’s subjective intent to threaten.”7 Though the Court 
is examining the issue under a particular statute, it is likely that the decision will be 
                                                          
5 33 U.S.C. § 875(c) (“[W]hoever transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication 
containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of another, shall be fined 
under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.”). 
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uniformly applied to other statutory bans on threats by way of the “true threat” 
doctrine.8 
A “true threat” is a statement “where the speaker means to communicate a 
serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular 
individual or group of individuals.”9 The definition requires an intent to threaten; 
however, the speaker need not actually intend to carry out the threat for it to be a 
“true threat.”10 Additionally, “[i]ntimidation in the constitutionally proscribable 
sense of the word is a type of true threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a 
person or group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily 
harm or death.”11 
This seemingly straight-forward doctrine has been muddled by Supreme 
Court opinions and lower courts’ interpretations of those opinions.12 The freedom 
of speech is the foundational threshold of our constitutional rights;13 however, that 
foundational right has been chipped away throughout the years by various 
exceptions limiting what speech is protected. 
The confusion surrounding “true threats” arises when we attempt to determine 
what intent is necessary for a true threats conviction. Is a subjective test to be used, 
in which the court examines whether the speaker intended to threaten, or should an 
objective test be used, in which a person may be found guilty regardless of his or 
her intent so long as a person is reasonable in perceiving the communication as a 
threat? In order to protect First Amendment freedoms, the Supreme Court in Elonis 
v. United States should require courts to consider subjective intent in the true threat 
analysis. Such a holding is necessary to protect against the many constitutional 
infringements that would occur otherwise. 
                                                          
8 United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 324 (3d Cir. 2013) (analyzing the violation of the statute 
by examining the true threat doctrine). 
9 Black, 538 U.S. at 360 (citing Watts, 394 U.S. at 708). 
10 Id. at 360. 
11 Id. 
12 Watts, 394 U.S. at 708; Black, 538 U.S. at 360. 
13 Black, 538 U.S. at 358 (2003) (quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting)); see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a bedrock 
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of 
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C. United States v. Elonis 
In United States v. Elonis, the Third Circuit analyzed a series of behaviors 
leading to the arrest of Mr. Elonis.14 Mr. Elonis was fired from his job following 
sexual harassment complaints and an altercation at a Halloween party.15 Following 
his termination, he posted an alleged threat on his Facebook page.16 He also made 
numerous posts about his wife, namely stating “someone out there should kill my 
wife,” “hurry up and die,” and “fold up your PFA and put it in your pocket [i]s it 
thick enough to stop a bullet?”17 Mr. Elonis also made a post alluding to the fact 
that he may have been planning to target an elementary school, stating, “hell hath 
no fury like a crazy man in a kindergarten class.”18 Lastly, he posted a threat to the 
FBI after an agent visited his home for questioning.19 These posts were the basis 
for Mr. Elonis’s arrest.20 
The Third Circuit, examining whether to convict Mr. Elonis, cited precedent 
that stated a true threat is one in which “a reasonable speaker would foresee the 
statement would be interpreted as a threat.”21 However, the court reevaluated its 
previous treatment of true threats in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Virginia v. Black, which seems to require a finding of subjective intent in order to 
deem speech a true threat.22 After evaluating the Black opinion, the Third Circuit 
held that the Court did not intend to make its holding broad enough to require a 
court to find subjective intent for a true threat conviction.23 To read it as such 
“would require adding language the Court did not write to read the passage as 
‘statements where the speaker means to communicate [and intends the statement to 
                                                          
14 Elonis, 730 F.3d at 324. 
15 Id. at 324. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 324–26. 
18 Id. at 326. 
19 Id. 
20 United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 326 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Count 1 threats to patrons and 
employees of Dorney Park & Wildwater Kingdom, Count 2 threats to his wife, Count 3 threats to 
employees of the Pennsylvania State Police and Berks County Sheriff’s Department, Count 4 threats to a 
kindergarten class, and Count 5 threats to an FBI agent.”); see Appendix (full text available of all 
threats). 
21 Id. at 323 (citing United States v. Kosma, 951 F.2d 549, 557 (3d Cir. 1991)). 
22 538 U.S. at 359 (“True threats” encompass those statements where the speaker means to 
communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular 
individual or group of individuals.). 
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be understood as] a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful 
violence.’”24 The Third Circuit further stated that communications could be 
considered threats even if some of them were not expressly threatening and some 
of them were conditional.25 
Mr. Elonis’s case is one of many cases surfacing in courts across the country 
involving a person whose communication may have been misinterpreted, leading to 
a conviction for transmitting a threat. Mr. Elonis, along with similarly situated 
defendants, are calling for courts to require a subjective intent to threaten in order 
to convict a person of transmitting a true threat. 
II. TRUE THREAT DOCTRINE JURISPRUDENCE 
Arguments regarding the standard to be used in analyzing threats can be 
traced as far back as the early twentieth century.26 On one side of the argument, 
Judge Learned Hand advocated that courts should only apply an objective test 
focusing on the actual content of the speech.27 Conversely, Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes believed the subjective intent of the speaker should also play a role in 
determining whether speech is a threat.28 In keeping with this philosophy, Justice 
Holmes announced the “clear and present danger” test in Schenck v. United States, 
which protected political speech unless the advocacy produced a “clear and present 
danger of bringing about a substantive harm.”29 This test was used in analyzing 
allegedly threatening statements for nearly half a century until the Supreme Court 
articulated a separate test specifically creating the true threats doctrine in 1969.30 
A. Supreme Court of the United States 
The Supreme Court expressly addressed the issue of true threats for the first 
time in Watts v. United States.31 In Watts, a young man at a political rally stated, “If 
                                                          
24 Id. (quoting Black, 538 U.S. at 359). 
25 Id. at 334. 
26 Scott Hammack, The Internet Loophole: Why Threatening Speech On-Line Requires a 
Modification of the Courts’ Approach to True Threats and Incitement, 36 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 
65, 68 (2002). 
27 Id. at 69 (citing Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917)). 
28 Id. (citing Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627–28 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
29 Id. (citing Schenck, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)). 
30 Id. at 72. 




J o u r n a l  o f  T e c h n o l o g y  L a w  &  P o l i c y  
Volume XV – Spring 2015 ● ISSN 2164-800X (online) 










they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.”32 
The Court did not conduct an in-depth analysis, but instead decided the issue in a 
brief, five-page opinion.33 In articulating the true threat doctrine, the Court stated 
that a statute which criminalizes a form of speech “must be interpreted with the 
commands of the First Amendment clearly in mind. What is a threat must be 
distinguished from what is constitutionally protected speech.”34 The Court stated 
that the particular statement at issue was hyperbole and not a true threat, especially 
considering the context, conditional nature, and the crowd’s reaction.35 For this 
reason, many courts have interpreted Watts as establishing an objective standard for 
the true threats analysis. 
The Watts decision was the first case in which the Supreme Court expressly 
noted the true threats concept; however, other cases offer further insight as to the 
permissible bounds of limiting the right to free speech. In Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, the Court articulated that face-to-face communications may be 
prohibited if they are “plainly likely to cause a breach of the peace by the 
addressee, words whose speaking constitute a breach of the peace by the speaker 
. . . .”36 
The Court also ruled on another seminal true threats case the same year as 
Watts. In Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Court examined free speech in the context of 
“incitement.”37 The Court held that “the constitutional guarantees of free speech 
and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of 
force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or 
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”38 
“[T]he mere abstract teaching of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a 
resort to force and violence, is not the same as preparing a group for violent action 
and steeling it to such action.”39 
                                                          
32 Id. at 706. 
33 Id. at 707–08. 
34 Id. at 705–07. 
35 Id. at 708. 
36 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942). 
37 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
38 Id. at 447. 
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The Court later reiterated the broad protection afforded by the First 
Amendment in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.40 There, the Court held that 
abrasive and violent words spoken at a rally were protected under the First 
Amendment.41 The “mere advocacy of the use of force or violence does not remove 
speech from the protection of the First Amendment.”42 The Court further 
emphasized the important policy behind protecting such speech: 
Strong and effective extemporaneous rhetoric cannot be 
nicely channeled in purely dulcet phrases. An advocate 
must be free to stimulate his audience with spontaneous 
and emotional appeals for unity and action in a common 
cause. When such appeals do not incite lawless action, 
they must be regarded as protected speech. To rule 
otherwise would ignore the “profound national 
commitment” that “debate on public issues should be 
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”43 
For years after the Watts decision, courts seemed to almost unanimously hold 
that an objective test was required under the true threat analysis, which would ask 
if a reasonable person would perceive the communication as a threat.44 Courts 
differed only over the nuances of how to apply the objective test. One court found 
that the focus should be on the speaker, and the court should analyze whether a 
reasonable speaker would perceive that a listener would perceive the 
                                                          
40 458 U.S. 886 (1982). 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 921 (citing Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447). 
43 Id. at 928 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). 
44 See, e.g., United States v. Kosma, 951 F.2d 549, 557 (3d Cir. 1991) (would an objectively 
reasonable person perceive the communication as a threat); United States v. Darby, 37 F.3d 1059, 1066 
(4th Cir. 1994) (“Whether a communication in fact contains a true threat is determined by the 
interpretation of a reasonable recipient familiar with the context of the communication.”); United States 
v. Miller, 115 F.3d 361, 363 (6th Cir. 1997) (“if a reasonable person would foresee that an objective 
rational recipient of the statement would interpret its language to constitute a serious expression of 
intent to harm”); United States v. Bellrichard, 994 F.2d 1318, 1323 (8th Cir. 1993) (“If a reasonable 
recipient, familiar with the context of the communication, would interpret it as a threat, the issue should 
go to the jury.”); United States v. Sovie, 122 F.3d 122, 125 (2d Cir. 1997) (whether an ordinary, 
reasonable recipient who is familiar with context of threat would interpret it as threat of injury); United 
States v. Viefhaus, 168 F.3d 392, 396 (10th Cir. 1999) (if a reasonable person would foresee the 
statement being interpreted by persons hearing or reading it); United States v. Nishnianidze, 342 F.3d 6, 
16 (1st Cir. 2003) (would a reasonable person aware of the circumstances perceive it as threatening); but 
see United States v. Twine, 853 F.2d 676, 680–81 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that the government must 
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communication as a threat.45 However, other courts typically only asked whether 
the recipient was reasonable in perceiving the speech as a true threat.46 As a result, 
the speaker was at the mercy of the listeners and their interpretation of his or her 
speech. 
The issue of true threats came before the Supreme Court again in 2003 when 
two separate cases were appealed to the high court. One case involved 
communication at an anti-abortion campaign, which allegedly constituted a true 
threat.47 Another involved two consolidated cases in which two men had been 
convicted under a Virginia statute proscribing the burning of crosses because such 
activity conveyed an intent to intimidate.48 The anti-abortion campaign case, 
Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of 
Life Activists (Planned Parenthood), presented an ideal set of facts for the Court to 
address the issue; however, the Court declined to hear the case.49 
In Planned Parenthood, the American Coalition of Life Activists (ACLA) 
posted several anti-abortion advertisement-style materials, two of which were 
particularly shocking.50 The “Deadly Dozen” poster listed thirteen doctors and their 
private information along with a heading of “GUILTY.”51 The “Nuremberg Files,” 
posted online, listed about 200 names of people associated with abortions, and they 
were color coded as follows: black font meant they were still working, grey font 
meant they were wounded, and a strikethrough meant they were deceased.52 The 
Ninth Circuit noted that “while advocating violence is protected, threatening a 
person with violence is not.”53 “If ACLA had merely endorsed or encouraged the 
violent actions of others, its speech would be protected.”54 
                                                          
45 United States v. Merrill, 746 F.2d 458, 462 (9th Cir. 1984). 
46 Kosma, 951 F.2d at 557; Darby, 37 F.3d at 1066; Miller, 115 F.3d at 363; Bellrichard, 994 
F.2d at 1323; Sovie, 122 F.3d at 125; Viefhaus, 168 F.3d at 396; Nishnianidze, 342 F.3d at 16. 
47 Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 
1058, 1064 (9th Cir. 2002). 
48 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 343 (2003). 
49 Am. Coal. of Life Activists v. Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc., 539 U.S. 
958 (2003). 
50 Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1064. 
51 Id. at 1064–65. 
52 Id. at 1065. 
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The court cited its own precedent and applied the reasonable speaker test: 
“Whether a particular statement may properly be considered to be a threat is 
governed by an objective standard—whether a reasonable person would foresee 
that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates 
the statement as a serious expression of intent to harm or assault.”55 The court 
further included in its analysis the subjective intent to intimidate, which was 
required by the statute at issue.56 
This case presented an opportunity for the Supreme Court to clarify its 
position on what analysis courts should use in determining whether communication 
is a true threat; however, the Court denied certiorari.57 Rather, the Supreme Court 
chose to address the issue of intent and true threats under the facts of Virginia v. 
Black.58 The problem that developed after this holding was that the issue at hand 
did not truly turn on whether subjective or objective intent was required in 
analyzing true threats. Rather, the court examined the constitutionality of a Virginia 
statute, which criminalized the act of burning a cross and found that doing so 
would be prima facie evidence of intent to intimidate.59 
The Virginia statute at issue stated: “It shall be unlawful for any person or 
persons, with the intent of intimidating any person or group of persons, to burn, or 
cause to be burned, a cross . . . . Any such burning of a cross shall be prima facie 
evidence of an intent to intimidate a person or group of persons.”60 
The Court stated, “Virginia’s statute does not run afoul of the First 
Amendment insofar as it bans cross burning with intent to intimidate.”61 The 
language of the opinion can easily be read to advocate for a subjective intent 
requirement to a true threat conviction. The Court found that the doctrine of true 
threats will “encompass those statements where the speaker means to communicate 
a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a 
particular individual or group of individuals.”62 The Court reasoned that the 
                                                          
55 Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1074 (quoting United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 
1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
56 Id. at 1080. 
57 Am. Coalition of Life Activists v. Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc., 539 
U.S. 958 (2003). 
58 535 U.S. 1094 (2002). 
59 Black, 538 U.S. at 348. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 362. 
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purpose of the prohibition is to protect individuals from fear of violence and the 
associated disruption; therefore, there is no requirement that the speaker actually 
intend to carry out the threat.63 Intimidation is constitutionally proscribable “where 
a speaker directs a threat to a person or group of persons with the intent of placing 
the victim in fear of bodily harm or death.”64 Furthermore, the Court found that the 
Virginia statute would not violate the First Amendment “insofar as it bans cross 
burning with intent to intimidate.”65 These statements and more in the opinion draw 
emphasis to the speaker’s purpose or intent behind the action. However, opponents 
argue that the Court only discussed the person’s subjective intent because the 
Virginia statute required an “intent to intimidate.”66 
The result of this less than clear opinion is that circuit courts are unsure of 
what test to apply. The cases below illustrate the variety of factual scenarios and 
the courts’ analyses of them in light of the Black holding. 
B. Circuit Courts of Appeal 
While the majority of courts seem to apply the objective listener test, a closer 
look reveals mass confusion. While a few courts are steadfast in the logic 
underlying their analysis, the cases described below illustrate that many of the 
courts have doubts regarding the validity of the objective approach or are simply 
following the majority’s lead in adopting it. 
In United States v. White, the Fourth Circuit thoroughly analyzed the Black 
holding but chose to reaffirm its objective approach, stating that the correct 
analysis is whether a person aware of the context would perceive the 
communication to be a threat.67 The court examined the language in Black that 
stated that true threats “encompass those statements where the speaker means to 
communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful 
violence to a particular individual or group of individuals,”68 and found this only 
means that the speaker intended to communicate, not that he intended to threaten.69 
                                                          
63 Id. at 360. 
64 Id. (emphasis added). 
65 Black, 538 U.S. at 362 (emphasis added). 
66 Elonis, 730 F.3d at 328–29; United States v. Clemens, 738 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2013). 
67 United States v. White, 670 F.3d 498, 509 (4th Cir. 2012). 
68 Id. at 508 (citing Black, 538 U.S. at 359). 
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The court upheld its objective analysis noting that the Supreme Court gave no 
indication that it was redefining the crime to require specific intent.70 
The Eighth and Eleventh Circuits reached the same conclusion.71 In citing the 
majority of circuits that had analyzed the true threat doctrine after Black, the Eighth 
Circuit reaffirmed its test of analyzing whether a reasonable person would interpret 
the communication as a threat.72 The Eleventh Circuit also held that Black did not 
disrupt the objective analysis, which courts had accepted prior to the Black 
decision.73 The Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed its objective analysis stating, 
“Knowingly transmitting the threat makes the act criminal—not the specific intent 
to carry it out or the specific intent to cause fear in another.”74 
Since Black, some courts have interpreted the true threats doctrine as 
requiring only an objective analysis, but have expressed doubts in doing so. The 
Second Circuit in United States v. Turner relied solely on its own precedent in 
holding that the analysis is whether a reasonable recipient, aware of the 
circumstances, would perceive the communication as a threat.75 The court cited 
United States v. Davila in upholding its objective analysis.76 However, the court 
noted that even though the Davila court post-dated Black, the court did not 
reexamine whether the Supreme Court’s decision altered the true threat analysis.77 
This speaks to the court’s uncertainty in the soundness of its precedent. Ultimately, 
the court used its previously established objective analysis to hold that Turner’s 
blog posts of judges’ photographs, work addresses, and a map of the courthouse 
could reasonably be interpreted as a threat.78 And though the court stated subjective 
intent was not necessary, it noted that “Turner’s intent to interfere with these 
judges—to intimidate them through threat of violence—could not have been more 
clearly stated in his pointed reference to their colleague, whose family members 
                                                          
70 Id. 
71 United States v. Nicklas, 713 F.3d 435, 440 (8th Cir. 2013); United States v. Martinez, 736 
F.3d 981, 986 (11th Cir. 2013) (upholding its test as to whether a reasonable person would interpret the 
communication as a threat). 
72 Nicklas, 713 F.3d at 439–40. 
73 Martinez, 736 F.3d at 998. 
74 Id. 
75 United States v. Turner, 720 F.3d 411, 420 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. Davila, 461 
F.3d 298, 305 (2d Cir. 2006)). 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
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had been killed.”79 Similar decisions reaffirming the objective analysis—but with 
hesitation—have occurred in the Sixth and Seventh Circuits. 
The Sixth Circuit, in United States v. Jeffries, stated that its precedent 
established the test of whether a reasonable observer would perceive the 
communication as a threat.80 However, the court also noted the Ninth Circuit 
rejection of the objective test, stating that it may represent the best reading of the 
statute at hand.81 Judge Sutton wrote a dubitante opinion in Jeffries in which he 
stated that subjective intent is “part and parcel of the meaning of a communicated 
‘threat’ to injure another.”82 Furthermore, Judge Sutton, in examining the history of 
the federal threat statute, 33 U.S.C. § 875(c), noted that it was initially written to 
prevent extortion.83 In doing so, Congress required the person have intent to extort; 
however, when it later added the prevention of threats, no such intent was written 
into the statute.84 Judge Sutton argues that Congress intended that intent in the 
extortion subsection be read throughout 33 U.S.C. § 875, which would require 
intent to threaten.85 Moreover, he noted that “[e]very relevant definition of the noun 
‘threat’ or the verb ‘threaten’ . . . includes an intent component” and does not 
recognize any objective component.86 However, the court stated that it would not 
depart from precedent without a more clear direction to do so.87 
The Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Parr, spoke approvingly of the 
subjective approach.88 While the court ultimately decided the case on other 
grounds, it did note, “It is possible that the Court was not attempting a 
comprehensive redefinition of true threats in Black; the plurality’s discussion of 
                                                          
79 Id. 
80 United States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473, 478 (6th Cir. 2012). 
81 Id. at 481. 
82 Id. at 484. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id.; Thomas DeBauche, Bursting Bottles: Doubting the Objective-Only Approach to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 875(c) in Light of United States v. Jeffries and the Norms of Online Social Networking, 51 HOUS. L. 
REV. 981, 996 (2014). 
86 DeBauche, supra note 85, at 997 (quoting Jeffries, 692 F.3d at 483–84) (“[T]o declare (usually 
conditional) one’s intention of inflicting injury upon” a person, says one dictionary. 11 OXFORD 
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 352 (1st ed. 1933). “[A]n expression of an intention to inflict loss or harm on 
another by illegal means, esp. [sic] when effecting coercion or duress of the person threatened,” says 
another. WEBSTER’S NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 2633 (2d ed. 1955). “A communicated intent to inflict 
harm or loss on another,” says still another. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1489 (7th ed. 1999).). 
87 Jeffries, 692 F.3d at 481. 
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threat doctrine was very brief. It is more likely, however, that an entirely objective 
definition is no longer tenable.”89 
Alternately, one circuit has kept the reasonable speaker test. The First Circuit 
in United States v. Clemens addressed whether it was required to change its 
previous true threats analysis based upon the Black holding.90 The court decided to 
follow its precedent in only requiring that a reasonable speaker would understand 
that the communication could be interpreted as a threat.91 In reaching this 
conclusion, the court cited other circuits that have reaffirmed their objective 
listener test following the Black holding.92 However, the First Circuit did not make 
an explicit rule on the issue; rather, it decided the issue on a plain error standard of 
review because Clemens did not raise the issue at the lower court.93 The court 
found that even if there were error as to the standard, it was not plain, and that the 
defendant likely would have been convicted even if they had imposed the 
subjective analysis.94 
For years after Black, only the Ninth Circuit had unequivocally embraced a 
subjective intent analysis for true threats, stating that it is “not sufficient that 
objective observers would reasonably perceive such speech as a threat of injury or 
death.”95 In United States v. Bagdasarian, the court examined that “[b]ecause the 
true threat requirement is imposed by the Constitution, the subjective test set forth 
in Black must be read into all threat statutes that criminalize pure speech.”96 
The Ninth Circuit was joined in 2014 by the Tenth Circuit, which also 
explicitly adopted the subjective analysis. In United States v. Heineman, the court 
conducted an in depth analysis of the Black holding and also weighed First 
Amendment concerns against the concern for protecting the public from fear of 
violence.97 The court noted that with statutes that criminalize speech, the statute 
“must be interpreted with the commands of the First Amendment clearly in 
                                                          
89 Id. 
90 738 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2013). 
91 Id. at 1 (“[W]e see no reason to depart from this circuit’s law that an objective test of 
defendant’s intent is used from the defendant’s vantage point.”). 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. (holding that proof of subjective intent could be proven by circumstantial evidence based on 
the particular facts). 
95 United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 2011). 
96 Id. at 1117. 
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mind.”98 In resolving the two conflicting concerns, the court stated, “When the 
speaker does not intend to instill fear, concern for the effect on the listener must 
yield.”99 
Notwithstanding the Court’s holding in Black or the circuit split, a subjective 
analysis of the speaker’s intent is required to protect First Amendment concerns in 
today’s society. The following section examines the negative practical implications 
of an objective test and advocates for the implementation of a subjective analysis. 
III. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS: ADVOCATING FOR THE SUBJECTIVE 
APPROACH 
Many courts have construed the true threat analysis as requiring only that the 
person hearing the communication is reasonable in interpreting it as a threat. In 
their reasoning, courts usually cite, among others, a concern for preventing “fear, 
disruption, and . . . risk of violence.”100 However, equally if not more important is 
the protection of our individual right to free speech. The objective test, when put 
into practice, seems to unduly limit the content of one’s speech for fear that it may 
be interpreted by someone as a threat. Below are examinations of First Amendment 
concerns, which arise when a defendant is convicted of communicating a true 
threat without regard to his subjective intent. Requiring a finding of subjective 
intent to threaten will still serve the purpose of the true threat doctrine while 
simultaneously protecting speech that falls within the bounds of the First 
Amendment. 
A. Protecting Dissenting Opinions 
The objective test places all power solely in the hands of the listener. He or 
she need only act reasonably in interpreting the communication, and the jury may 
convict the speaker of threatening the person. “The purely objective approach 
allows speakers to be convicted for negligently making a threatening statement—
that is, for making a statement the speaker did not intend to be threatening, but that 
a reasonable person would perceive as such. This potential chills core political 
speech.”101 
There is no requirement that the communication reach the person to whom it 
is addressed or that the person even be physically capable of completing the 
                                                          
98 Id. at 973. 
99 Id. at 982. 
100 DeBauche, supra note 85, at 993. 
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threat.102 As a result, the true threat standard is met if any person reasonably 
perceives the communication as a threat.103 The effect is that a person may feel 
threatened merely because the speech is violent or socially unacceptable, which is 
constitutionally improper.104 “A statute that proscribes speech without regard to the 
speaker’s intended meaning runs the risk of punishing protected First Amendment 
expression simply because it is crudely or zealously expressed.”105 Therefore, the 
objective test can have the effect of allowing a jury to convict a person for a threat, 
when in fact the communication was merely socially unacceptable or outside the 
norm. 
Justice Marshall cautioned against an objective approach in his concurrence in 
Rogers v. United States, stating that in an objective approach, 
[T]he defendant is subject to prosecution for any 
statement that might reasonably be interpreted as a 
threat, regardless of the speaker’s intention . . . charging 
the defendant with the responsibility for the effect of his 
statements on his listeners . . . . [W]e should be 
particularly wary of adopting such a standard for a 
statute that regulates pure speech.106 
As a general matter, the fact that society may find speech offensive is not a 
sufficient reason for suppressing it. Speech that is called hateful, or speech that is 
unpopular, or speech with which people strongly disagree, may still be protected 
speech.107 
                                                          
102 Jeffries, 692 F.3d at 483 (holding that conviction under 33 U.S.C. § 875(c) “does not require a 
threat to be communicated to its target”); United States v. Miller, 115 F.3d 361, 363 (6th Cir. 1997) 
(holding that a “prosecutable threatening communication need not be supported either by evidence of 
the author’s actual ability to carry out his threat”); see also United States v. Parr, 545 F.3d 491, 498 (7th 
Cir. 2008) (“It is well-established that the government is not required to prove that the defendant in a 
threat case intended or was able to carry out his threats.”). 
103 DeBauche, supra note 85, at 998. 
104 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a bedrock principle underlying the 
First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because 
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”). 
105 Brief of American Civil Liberties Union, The Abrams Institute for Freedom of Expression, 
The Cato Institute, The Center for Democracy & Technology, and The National Coalition Against 
Censorship as Amicus Curiae, at 5, Elonis v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014) (No. 13-983). 
106 Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35 (1975) (J. Marshall, concurring). 
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The Supreme Court has recognized that such publicly unpopular speech is 
still entitled to protection. In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, the Court stated, “Essential 
to the formulation is the prepositional clause after ‘fear’; ‘fear’ and ‘fear of 
violence’ are two very different things.”108 The Court again articulated this 
principle in Black, saying, “It should be clear, then, that true threats are only 
excepted from the First Amendment protection due to their capacity to intimidate, 
not due to their potential to create fear in a recipient listener.”109 In short, speech 
can invoke fear and still be protected. When courts do not require juries to consider 
speakers’ subjective intents, these speakers may only protect themselves from 
liability by quieting their opinions. 
B. Reducing the Chilling Effect 
Requiring evidence of subjective intent reduces the potential chilling effect of 
§ 875(c) by ensuring that only threats directed at specific individuals or groups are 
subject to liability.110 Most courts state that they are hesitant to require a subjective 
intent because courts have found that there is no need to find the speaker intended 
to carry out his threat. However, such concerns are without merit as courts have 
repeatedly held that there is no requirement that the speaker intend to carry out his 
threat.111 Nor is there a requirement that there be a precise time in which the threat 
will be carried out or that the speech even be communicated to the victim.112 
Opponents of the subjective approach say that requiring a subjective intent to 
threaten would be too high of a standard, ultimately allowing violators to walk 
free.113 It is of particular importance to remember that subjective intent can be 
established through any number of evidentiary findings. A full-blown confession of 
                                                          
108 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992). 
109 Black, 538 U.S. at 365. 
110 Pedro Celis, When Is a YouTube Video a “True Threat”?, 9 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 227, 
229 (2014). 
111 See, e.g., Jeffries, 692 F.3d at 478; United States v. Lincoln, 589 F.2d 379, 381 (8th Cir. 
1979); United States v. Chatman, 584 F.2d 1358, 1361 (4th Cir. 1978). 
112 United States v. Parr, 545 F.3d 491, 497 (7th Cir. 2008); but see Porter v. Ascension Parish 
Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 616–17 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that a threat must be “communicated to either 
the object of the threat or a third person”). 
113 United States v. Martinez, 736 F.3d 981, 987–88 (11th Cir. 2013) (“Particularly noteworthy is 
the Third Circuit’s insight that ‘[l]imiting the definition of true threats to only those statements where 
the speaker subjectively intended to threaten would fail to protect individuals from the fear of violence 
and the disruption that fear engenders, because it would protect speech that a reasonable speaker would 
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the speaker’s true intention is not necessary.114 The jury only need find that they 
believe the speaker intended that the communication be a threat. “Requiring the 
government to demonstrate subjective intent to threaten as part of any true threat 
prosecution strikes the constitutionally appropriate balance between the 
government’s interest in protecting against the harms caused by threats and the 
country’s constitutional tradition of encouraging the free and uninhibited exchange 
of ideas.”115 
One might argue that rather than impose a subjective approach on true threats, 
speakers should bear the burden and be more careful with their word choices. 
However, courts have found that even where there is not an explicit threat, a jury’s 
finding that the person reasonably interpreted a statement as a threat is sufficient to 
convict.116 “The purely objective approach allows speakers to be convicted for 
negligently making a threatening statement—that is, for making a statement the 
speaker did not intend to be threatening, but that a reasonable person would 
perceive as such. This potentially chills certain speech.”117 For example, in United 
States v. Clemens, the First Circuit upheld a jury conviction in which the following 
statement was found to be a true threat: “I really, truly and sincerely wish you were 
dead. Oh, how I wish a 10-ton I-beam would fall on you. . . . Boy, would I love to 
see that! Perhaps someday I will.”118 The court affirmed the conviction, 
notwithstanding its ambiguity, holding that the only requirement is that a 
reasonable person would expect someone to interpret the statement as a threat.119 
Similarly, the Second Circuit affirmed a jury conviction where a man stated 
on his blog that judges should be killed following a court opinion.120 The post was 
later updated to include personal information, room numbers, and a map for 
                                                          
114 See, e.g., Celis, supra note 110, at 229 (“Subjective intent to threaten [can be] demonstrated by 
evidence that the [communication] was disseminated to the threatened individual or that the threat was 
made to further a purpose through intimidation.”). 
115 Brief of American Civil Liberties Union, The Abrams Institute for Freedom of Expression, 
The Cato Institute, The Center for Democracy & Technology, and The National Coalition Against 
Censorship as Amicus Curiae, at 23, Elonis v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014) (No. 13-983). 
116 Elonis, 730 F.3d at 334 (“there is no rule that a conditional statement cannot be a true threat”); 
Clemens, 738 F.3d at 8 (“We have rejected any requirement that threats be ‘unequivocal, unconditional, 
and specific.’”). 
117 White, 670 F.3d at 524. 
118 Clemens, 738 F.3d at 5. 
119 Id. at 12; see also White, 670 F.3d at 502–03 (4th Cir. 2012) (affirming a conviction that the 
following statement was a threat: “Lord knows that drawing too much publicity and making people 
upset is what did in Joan Lefkow, . . . . Lefkow was a judge whose husband and mother had been 
murdered by a disgruntled litigant[.]”). 
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navigating the courthouse.121 The court held that the communication could 
reasonably be interpreted as a threat.122 The injustice here is not the ultimate 
findings of the juries; rather, it is that the juries are explicitly kept from giving any 
consideration whatsoever to the speaker’s intention.123 The result is that the 
objective approach may allow juries to convict a person based on speech that is in 
fact protected under the First Amendment.124 A subjective intent requirement is 
necessary to retain the First Amendment protections guaranteed in the Constitution. 
The fact that the true threat doctrine limits that protection demands application of a 
subjective intent approach to ensure that only truly proscribable speech is 
regulated. Similarly, incitement, another unprotected area of speech, requires the 
subjective intent of “advocacy [that] is directed to inciting or producing imminent 
lawless action.”125 Therefore, the only logical conclusion is that threats should 
require the same subjective intent. 
C. Twenty-First Century Communication Practices 
The transition to online communication practices also brings to light concern 
over the use of an objective approach. Methods of communication have drastically 
changed with the turn of the twenty-first century. People are more interconnected 
than ever before, and the typical sequence of thought is post now, think later.126 
“Through the use of chat rooms, any person with a phone line can become a town 
crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox. Through 
the use of web pages, mail exploders, and newsgroups, the same individual can 
become a pamphleteer.”127 Now, more than ever, “[t]he content on the Internet is as 
diverse as human thought.”128 The result with respect to an objective true threats 
analysis is that a person posting a message may be liable to any person who then 
                                                          
121 Id. at 415–16. 
122 Id. at 425. 
123 Clemens, 738 F.3d at 12; White, 670 F.3d at 512; Turner, 720 F.3d at 425. 
124 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that the First Amendment 
protects the advocacy of violence and that speech will not be afforded such protection only if it is 
intended to cause “imminent lawless action”). 
125 Brief of The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and Nine Media Organizations as 
Amicus Curiae, at 11, Elonis v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (No. 13-983) (2014) (quoting 
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447). 
126 Hammack, supra note 26, at 83 (“Now, in a fit of rage, people can email or post a threat, that 
with even a moment’s reflection they otherwise would not have. Once the message is out in cyberspace, 
it is often impossible to delete and may continue to incite readers long after the speaker has moderated 
her position.”). 
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reads that post and reasonably interprets it as a threat. This range of liability is vast 
considering that there is no requirement that the threat be communicated to the 
intended person or with any immediacy or specificity.129 
Communication across the Internet allows for the reader to interpret words 
with very few limitations, without regard as to who the person is, his or her 
mindset, tone of voice, or intended audience.130 “A speaker may post a statement 
online with the expectation that a relatively small number of people will see it, 
without anticipating that it could be read—and understood very differently—by a 
much broader audience.”131 
“Internet users often assume entirely new identities, sometimes with new 
personalities, and occasionally even with a new gender.”132 This “fantasy-type 
world” can alter a speaker’s cognitive skills, which some have even characterized 
as a defense known as “Internet intoxication.”133 Consequently, the subjective 
approach is required to adapt the legal analysis to communication transmitted 
across the Internet. 
The Ninth Circuit recognized the new complexities involved in speech 
disseminated through the Internet in its application of the subjective approach in 
United States v. Bagdasarian.134 In Bagdasarian, a man posted numerous violent 
statements in an online message board, which advocated that President Obama 
should be killed.135 The court held that no reasonable person could find that this 
man intended to threaten the life of President Obama.136 The court held that “[a] 
statement that the speaker does not intend as a threat is afforded constitutional 
protection and cannot be held criminal.”137 The court further stated that Black 
requires the State to punish only those threats in which the “speaker means to 
                                                          
129 Clemens, 738 F.3d at 8; Turner, 720 F.3d at 424. 
130 Hammack, supra note 26, at 84 (“Thus, an Internet threat is more intimidating than a threat 
made in other media.”). 
131 Brief of American Civil Liberties Union, The Abrams Institute for Freedom of Expression, 
The Cato Institute, The Center for Democracy & Technology, and The National Coalition Against 
Censorship as Amicus Curiae, at 25, Elonis v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014) (No. 13-983). 
132 Hammack, supra note 26, at 84. 
133 Id. 
134 Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2011). 
135 Id. at 1115–16. 
136 Id. at 1123. 
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communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful 
violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.”138 
Without the protection that the subjective analysis provides, a 
disproportionate amount of people will be prosecuted for communicating virtually 
innocent, constitutionally protected speech.139 
A subjective intent requirement addresses this problem 
by allowing a jury to consider more evidence 
contextualizing the online comment than could be 
considered under a purely objective standard, including 
the defendant’s intended audience, other remarks 
clarifying the challenged statement’s meaning, the 
defendant’s motive for making the statement, and so 
forth.140 
D. Protecting Creative Expression 
The protection of artistic expression also requires the adoption of a subjective 
intent requirement in analyzing true threats. The Supreme Court has emphasized 
the importance of protecting dissenting political speech.141 However, in practice, 
that is not always the result. For example, in Jeffries, the court affirmed the jury’s 
conviction that a music video posted on YouTube constituted a threat against a 
judge.142 The court held that the defendant could not insulate his threat by putting it 
in the form of a music video.143 The court, however, did not allow evidence of the 
defendant’s subjective intent.144 Nor did the court allow evidence that the defendant 
                                                          
138 Id. at 1117 (quoting Black, 538 U.S. at 359). 
139 See, e.g., Hunter Stewart, Caleb Clemmons, Georgia Southern University Student, Jailed Over 
Tumblr Remark, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 12, 2013, 3:07 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2013/08/12/caleb-clemmons-jailed-tumblr-remark_n_3743477.html (student arrested for a post stating 
that he was going to post a threat on his account as a literary experiment to see if he would be 
prosecuted). 
140 Brief of American Civil Liberties Union, The Abrams Institute for Freedom of Expression, 
The Cato Institute, The Center for Democracy & Technology, and The National Coalition Against 
Censorship as Amicus Curiae, at 27, Elonis v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014) (No. 13-983). 
141 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (protecting “Fuck the Draft” as political speech). 
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had previously posted numerous other videos in an effort to show the jury his odd 
sense of humor.145 
Similarly, allegedly threatening rap lyrics were at issue in Bell v. Itawamba 
County School Board. In this case, an aspiring rap artist and high school student 
was punished for recording a rap song including the following lyrics: “looking 
down girls’ shirts/drool running down your mouth/messing with wrong one/going 
to get a pistol down your mouth,” and “middle fingers up if you can’t stand that 
nigga/middle fingers up if you want to cap that nigga.”146 The artist used alleged 
actions of a teacher (which were told to him by the alleged victims) as inspiration 
for rap lyrics.147 The rap artist did not bring his recording to school; rather, he 
posted it on Facebook, which is how students and teachers at school discovered 
it.148 The court found that the First Amendment did not protect the lyrics of his 
song; therefore, the school board was appropriate in taking action against the rap 
artist based upon the finding that the lyrics constituted a threat.149 
As illustrated above, the concern in criminalizing speech without requiring 
subjective intent is especially heightened with respect to rap lyrics. “To an outside 
observer, for instance, the frenetic and aggressive maneuvers of break dancers 
engaged in head-to-head competitions (called “battles”) can appear out of control 
or violent; in fact, there have been cases in which police intervened because they 
mistakenly believed the dancers were fighting.”150 Requiring subjective intent 
would protect this form of art and expression while regulating the speech, which 
meets the threshold of being a true threat. 
E. Protecting Satire and Hyperbole 
Protection of speech that is meant for entertainment purposes also requires the 
implementation of a subjective analysis. It is a fundamental truth that hyperbole is 
protected under the First Amendment.151 The protection of “loose, figurative, or 
hyperbolic language” assures that “public debate will not suffer for lack of 
‘imaginative expression’ or the ‘rhetorical hyperbole’ which has traditionally added 
                                                          
145 Id. 
146 Bell v. Itawamba Cnty. Sch. Bd., 859 F. Supp. 2d 834, 836 (N.D. Miss. 2012). 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 840. 
150 Brief of the Marion B. Brechner First Amendment Project and Rap Music Scholars (Professors 
Erik Nielson and Charis E. Kubrin) as Amicus Curiae, at 8, Elonis v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2819 
(2014) (No. 13-983). 
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much to the discourse of this Nation.”152 Despite this well-established principle, 
several situations have arisen involving the allegation that a speaker’s hyperbolic 
speech is a threat. In one case, an newspaper editorial contained a comedic 
narrative of how terribly George W. Bush performed as a president.153 The editorial 
asked Jesus to “claim the life” of then-President Bush and several members of his 
administration, adding that it would be fine if Jesus sent “some crazy mortal” to do 
the job.154 Secret Service invaded the publisher’s officers and told them charges 
would be pressed.155 Though the incident did not result in a conviction, the 
intrusive nature and harassment that ensued places great hardship on the 
defendants. Clearly establishing a subject intent requirement would prevent such 
meritless actions. 
A similar incident occurred in Arizona. In 2003, the Tucson Citizen published 
a letter to the editor that stated, “Whenever there is an assassination or another 
atrocity we should proceed to the closest mosque and execute five of the first 
Muslims we encounter.”156 The trial court allowed an action by a Muslim couple, 
which contained claims of assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress.157 
The Arizona Supreme Court ultimately dismissed the claim, but it did so under an 
objective standard citing that the conditional nature and ambiguity precluded 
anyone from finding there was a true threat.158 The courts that do not give any 
deference to the fact that language is conditional or ambiguous may not have 
reached the same result.159 
One of the most alarming recent cases involves concerns of both Internet 
communication and hyperbole. Justin Carter, a 19-year-old boy in San Antonio, 
Texas, was arrested for a post made on a Facebook group for fans and players of 
League of Legends, a popular video game.160 Another poster called Carter “crazy” 
to which he replied, “I’m fucked in the head alright. I think I’ma shoot up a 
                                                          
152 Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 2 (1990). 
153 Lauren Gilbert, Mocking George: Political Satire as ‘True Threat’ in the Age of Global 
Terrorism, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 843, 848 (2004). 
154 Id. 
155 Id. 
156 Citizen Publishing Co. v. Miller, 115 P.3d 107, 109 (Ariz. 2005). 
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 115. 
159 Clemens, 738 F.3d at 12; White, 670 F.3d at 512; Turner, 720 F.3d at 425. 
160 Doug Gross, Teen in jail for months over ‘sarcastic’ Facebook threat, CNN (July 3, 2013, 
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kindergarten and watch the blood of the innocent rain down and eat the beating 
heart of one of them.”161 The post was followed by “J/K” and “LOL,” serving as 
abbreviations of “just kidding” and “laughing out loud,” respectively.162 
Nevertheless, a woman in Canada reported the threat, which resulted in authorities 
jailing Carter.163 The teen was released after five long months, when an anonymous 
donor paid his bail.164 The fact that what appears to be a joke made by a teenager 
may result in a true threat conviction is particularly alarming. Furthermore, the case 
illustrates how once words are posted, they may be interpreted by an 
undeterminable audience. It is unlikely that Carter intended for a woman in Canada 
to interpret his comments as a threat, but requiring only an objective intent could 
lead to that result. This case has not yet been heard before a court.165 Carter hopes 
that the Supreme Court’s decision in Elonis will result in his charges being 
dismissed.166 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As the previously mentioned cases illustrate, millions of people across our 
nation who speak words they may believe are protected may unknowingly be 
subjecting themselves to liability for communicating a “true threat.” Without 
analyzing the speaker’s subjective intent, this will result in the conviction of a 
speaker simply because someone, somewhere interpreted his or her speech as a 
threat, by no intention of the speaker. Many proponents of the objective approach 
have expressed concerns that the difficulty in proving subjective intent will 
undermine the purpose of prosecuting those who communicate true threats.167 On 
the contrary, it will simply ensure that only those who communicate true threats are 
found guilty, rather than those who are communicating within their First 
Amendment rights. Most importantly, the subjective analysis does not set the 
burden of proof too high. There is no confession of the defendant’s mindset 




164 Brandon Griggs, Teen jailed for Facebook ‘joke’ is released, CNN (July 12, 2013, 12:56 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/12/tech/social-media/facebook-jailed-teen. 
165 Id. 
166 Zeke MacCormack, High Court Case Could Affect Comal County’s Accused Facebook 
Threatener, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS (Nov. 30, 2014, 9:39 PM), http://www.expressnews.com/ 
news/local/article/High-court-case-could-affect-Comal-County-s-5926275.php. 
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needed. Subjective intent may be deduced based upon objective evidence.168 For 
example, a jury can infer intent to kill when a person uses a deadly weapon, 
without any subjective evidence about the defendant’s state of mind.169 Likewise, 
subjective intent to threaten may be deduced from the defendant’s conduct. The 
subjective analysis simply provides fair opportunity for the defendant to explain the 
speech and ultimately diminishes an objective standard’s chilling effect. 
Punishing a speaker without examining his or her subjective intent results in 
consequences that are contrary to intentions of legal punishment and serves as an 
obstacle to the practical operation of the justice system. An objective analysis alone 
unduly hinders speech and takes away a significant component of the First 
Amendment right to freedom of speech. The Supreme Court in its decision in 
Elonis v. United States has the opportunity to restate the broad protection afforded 
by the First Amendment. The Court should articulate a new standard required for a 
true threat conviction—requiring the speaker’s subjective intent to threaten. 
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Threats Made by Mr. Elonis 
Threats made to Dorney Park employees: 
Moles. Didn’t I tell ya’ll I had several? Ya’ll saying I had access to keys for the 
fucking gates, that I have sinister plans for all my friends and must have taken 
home a couple. Ya’ll think it’s too dark and foggy to secure your facility from a 
man as mad as me. You see, even without a paycheck I’m still the main attraction. 
Whoever thought the Halloween haunt could be so fucking scary?170 
Threats made to Mrs. Elonis: 
Did you know that it’s illegal for me to say I want to kill my wife? 
It’s illegal. 
It’s indirect criminal contempt. 
It’s one of the only sentences that I’m not allowed to say. 
Now it was okay for me to say it right then because I was just telling you that it’s 
illegal for me to say I want to kill my wife. 
I’m not actually saying it. 
I’m just letting you know that it’s illegal for me to say that. 
It’s kind of like a public service. 
I’m letting you know so that you don’t accidently go out and say something like 
that. 
Um, what’s interesting is that it’s very illegal to say I really, really think someone 
out there should kill my wife. 
That’s illegal. 
Very, very illegal. 
But not illegal to say with a mortar launcher. 
Because that’s its own sentence. 
It’s an incomplete sentence but it may have nothing to do with the sentence before 
that. So that’s perfectly fine. 
Perfectly legal. 
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I also found out that it’s incredibly illegal, extremely illegal, to go on Facebook and 
say something like the best place to fire a mortar launcher at her house would be 
from the cornfield behind it because of easy access to a getaway road and you’d 
have a clear line of sight through the sun room. 
Insanely illegal. 
Ridiculously, wrecklessly, insanely illegal. 






There’s one way to love you but a thousand ways to kill you. I’m not going to rest 
until your body is a mess, soaked in blood and dying from all the little cuts. . . . So 
hurry up and die, bitch, so I can forgive you.172 
Threats to Mrs. Elonis and local law enforcement: 
Fold up your PFA and put it in your pocket Is it thick enough to stop a bullet? 
Try to enforce an Order 
That was improperly granted in the first place Me thinks the judge needs an 
education on true threat jurisprudence 
And prison time will add zeroes to my settlement 
Which you won’t see a lick 
Because you suck dog dick in front of children 
And if worse comes to worse 
I’ve got enough explosives to take care of the state police and the sheriff’s 
department173 
Threat to local elementary school: 
                                                          
171 Id. at 324–25. 
172 Id. at 324. 
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That’s it, I’ve had about enough 
I’m checking out and making a name for myself Enough elementary schools in a 
ten mile radius to initiate the most heinous school shooting ever imagined 
And hell hath no fury like a crazy man in a kindergarten class 
The only question is . . . which one?174 
Threats to FBI: 
You know your shit’s ridiculous when you have the FBI knockin’ at yo’ door 
Little Agent Lady stood so close 
Took all the strength I had not to turn the bitch ghost 
Pull my knife, flick my wrist, and slit her throat Leave her bleedin’ from her 
jugular in the arms of her partner 
[laughter] 
So the next time you knock, you best be serving a warrant 
And bring yo’ SWAT and an explosives expert while you’re at it 
Cause little did y’all know, I was strapped wit’ a bomb 
Why do you think it took me so long to get dressed with no shoes on? 
I was jus’ waitin’ for y’all to handcuff me and pat me down 
Touch the detonator in my pocket and we’re all goin’ 
[BOOM!]175 
                                                          
174 Id. at 326. 
175 Id. at 334. 
